Security council resolution 2254 is an ambitious document. It puts a UN imprimatur on a timetable of six months to create a transitional, united Syrian government and 18 months for a new constitution and democratic elections.
In addition to this sequencing, it adds elements that are critical if the peace plan is to become real. The question of Bashar al-Assad’s future was put to one side earlier this year – otherwise the talks would never have got off the ground. It was agreed that the question of leadership would ultimately be decided by elections, but who would control those elections and what would the rules be? The resolution addresses those questions for the first time.
The UN will administer the vote, and it will include the diaspora – the displaced and the refugees. A free, inclusive poll makes it more likely there will be political change and solve the Assad question. The political transition is to begin in January, with talks between representatives of the regime and an opposition coalition, put together in Riyadh on 10 December. A ceasefire is supposed to take effect at the same time.
It is a deal that could have been struck years ago, before – as John Kerry put it on Friday – “one Syrian in 20 has been killed or wounded; one in five is a refugee; one in two has been displaced; the average life expectancy in Syria has dropped by 20 years”.
It is only now that outside powers are being sucked ever deeper into the conflict that a strong desire for compromise has emerged. The resolution creates a framework, but one that leaves yawning gaps between its timbers. It is not clear whether the regime will show up to the January talks brokered by the UN special envoy, Staffan di Mistura, though Damascus will presumably come under strong pressure from Moscow and Tehran to attend.
There are also a lot of questions of the relationship between the Riyadh opposition and the balance of forces inside rebel-held territory. If the disconnect is too great, the talks will lead nowhere and will not bring a ceasefire. But inclusivity brings with it a cost.
Neither the protagonists nor their international sponsors agree on the list of terrorist groups to be excluded. There is consensus on Islamic State (now known to almost all parties by the Arabic acronym Daesh), and near-consensus on the al-Nusrah Front. After that, agreement breaks down. And the discord was evident from the contrasting tone of the remarks from John Kerry and Sergei Lavrov after the resolution was passed. Russia is currently bombing groups and communities supported by the west.
Jordan was given the job of distinguishing between the acceptable and unacceptable but has essentially passed the buck, simply collating the differing views of the outside powers.
Any ceasefire and any eventual peace agreement will at best apply to those areas of western and northern Syria currently controlled by the regime or non-Daesh rebels. It is unclear what will happen in regions under the sway of a mix of rebel groups, including “acceptable” forces in alliance with al-Nusrah. The UN monitoring of a ceasefire and any eventual elections in such a fragile environment would be very hazardous affair.
But Resolution 2254 at least does bring closer a short-term truce that could curtail the biggest cause of civilian casualties, bombing of civilian areas by the Assad regime, currently with the help of the Russian air force. Once that comes to an end, many other things begin to become possible.